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NOTES
CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-AUCTIONEERS-MEMORAN-

DUM-In Dewar v. Mfintoft' it appeared that the auctioneer at a
sale of land entered on the margin of his copy of the particulars and
conditions of sale against the lot, the name of the highest bidder
for the lot, and the amount of the bid, but there was nothing to
indicate that he was purchaser of the lot. The bidder did not
sign the memorandum of agreement contained in the particulars
or pay any deposit. He subsequently wrote letters to the vendor
and his agent, in which he repudiated his liability under the contract, but set out all the terms of the bargain and referred to the
particulars of sale. It was held that the entry by the auctioneer
was not a sufficient note or memorandum in writing to satisfy the
fourth section of the statute of frauds, but that the later correspondence did take the oral contract out of the statute in spite of
the repudiation of liability.
The early English cases deny that the auctioneer is the agent
181

L. J. 885 (K. B., 1912).
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of b(,th parties and therefore hold that his entering the name of
the tuver of a lot of land in his book as the purchaser is not a note
in writing within the statute of frauds, lut in Enincrson v. Heelis
and later cases' it was held that an auctioneer is an agent lawfully
authorized by the buyer to sign a note or memorandum of a conwhether it be for a purchase of an interest in land or
tract for iim,
of goods. The memorandum in order to be valid, must have been
made contemporaneously with the sale- and must state the particulars of the contract.' The present English law on the subject
seems to be most clearly stated in Sims v. Landray:' "It is settled
beyond the probability of now being successfully disputed, that
where there is a sale by public auction and the property is knocked
down by the auctioneer to the highest bidder, the auctioneer is
the agent not only of the vendor, but also of the purchaser, the highest bidder, and that lie is the purchaser's agent clearly to this
extent, that he is entitled to sign, in the name and on behalf of
the purchaser a memorandum sufficient to satisfy the provisions
of the statute of frauds, stating the partictlars of the contract."
The American authorities are to the same effect.'
But the memorandum must be clear and complete on its face.
So in Hinde v. Whitehouse' it was held that an auctioneer had not
satisfied the requirements of the statute by signing the- name of
the purchaser to the catalogue, that not being connected with or
referring to the condition of sale; and in Baptist Church v. BigelowuJ that the memorandum was not sufficient within the requirements of the New York statute, where the auctioneer had merely
noted the name of the purchaser and the sum bid by him upon the
chart of the goods sold. It seems clear that the court was correct
in the principal case.
As to the question of correspondence, both text-books and
authorities declare that a complete binding contract may be evidenced by letters or other documents relating to one connected
transaction from which the names or descriptions of the parties,
2

Stansfield v. Johnson, j Esp. iot (C. P.. 1794); approved in Buckmaster
v. Harrop, 13 Ves. 456, at p. 473 (1807); cf., however, Simon v. Metivier, i Black.
W. 599 (1766).
32 Taunt. 38 (i8o9).
4 White v. Proctor, 4 Taunt. 209 (1811); Kemys v. Proctor, 3 V. & B. 57
(181A ddison. Law of Contracti (iith Ed.) p. 42; Mews v.
Carr, 26 L. J. Ex.
39 (r8j6); Bell v. Balls, 66 L. J.Ch. 397 (1897).
6 Browne, Statute of Frauds (5th Ed.) sects. 351, 369; Wood. Statute of
Frauds, Sect. 371; Kenworthy v. Schofield, 2 B. & C. 945 (1824); Peirce v.
Corf, L. R. 43 Q. B.52 (1874).
7 63 L. J.Ch. 535 (1894).
8 Singstack's Executors v. Harding, 4 Harr. & J.186 (Md., 1816); Cleaves
v. Foss, 4 Greenl. 9 (Me., 1826); Adams v. McMillan, Executor, 7 Port. 73
(Ala., z838): Morton v. Dean, 13 Met. 385 (Mass., 1847); Gill v. Bicknell, 2
Cush. 355 (Mass.. 1848), approving Morton v. Dean, supra; Gill v. Hewett, 7
bush. io (Ky., 1869); Ansley v. Green, 82 Ga. 18x (1888); Springer v. Klein
orge. 83 Mo. 152 (188 4 ); Garth v. Davis & Johnson, 120 Ky. 1o6 (1905).
'7 East. 558 (18o6).
1016 Wend. 28 (N. Y., 1836).
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the subject matter ,.fthe contract, and its terms may be collected."
But will i-n oral contract e taken out of the statute by letters
which admit the making of the contract by the writer, but in terms
repudiate hit liability? Before there were cases upon this subject,
Mr.Blackburn, in his Treatise on the Contract of Sale* had said:
"It sometimes happens that after a dispute has arisen, a party in
a letter signed by him recapitulates the whole terms of the bargain,
for the purpose of saying that it is at an end. . . . It has never
been decided whether such an admission of the terms of the bargain signed for the express purpose of repudiation can be considered
a memorandum to make the confract good* but it seems difficult
on principle to see how it can be so considered."
When the question actually arose in Bailey v. Sweeting" the
words of Mr. Blackburn gave the court some difficulty, but in
spite of them it was held that "tht. first part of the letter is unquestionably a note or memorandum of the.bargain ........
it does not cease to be evidence of the contract because the defendThe parant goes on to say that he should not be bound by it."
ticular point does not seem to have been frequently passed upon
by the courts either in England or America, but the cases which have
arisen quote Bailey v. Sweeting with approval and follow the decision in that case." The weight of authority is undoubtedly to
the effect that if a party writes a letter admitting the essential
particulars of the contract, but containing a repudiation of the
bargain upon bad or insufficient grounds, the letter will constitute
a good memorandum of the contract within the statute.
Upon both questions-whether the entry of the auctioneer
at the time of sale, or subsequent correspondence admitting the
particulars of the contract and repudiating liability, constitute a
sufficient memorandum to satisfy the statute of frauds-the court
in our principal case appears to have followed principles well recognized in both England and America.
t.A.L.
EVIDENCE -CONSONANT

STATEMENTS-HEARSAY-In the case

of Lyke v. Lehigh V. R. R. Co.,' the plaintiff's testimony was attacked on cross-examination and by proof of inconsistent statements. To show that the testimony given by the plaintiff was not
a recent fabrication, the trial court admitted declarations by the
it Addison on Contracts, (izth Ed.) p. 36, and cases cited; Smith, Law of
Fraud, Sect. 38t and cases cited; Wood, Statute of Frauds, Sect. 364, and cases
cited.
12 Blackburn, Contract of Sale, p. 66.
nL.J. 30 C. P. 15o (1861).
14Wilkinson v. Eans, L. R. 35 C. P. 224 (t866); Buxton v. Rust, L R. I4
Ex. 172 (1872); Cloth Company v. Hieronimus, L. R. zo Q. B. i40 (875);
Heideman v. Wolfstein, 12 Mo. Apps." 366 (1882).
tith Ed.) p. 38; Wood, Statute of Frauds,
1See Addison, Law of Contracts (i
Sect. 345; Browne, Statute of Frauds (sth Ed.) Sec. 354-a.
1 236 Pa. 38 (t912).

VOTFS

plaintiff a short time after the accident consonant with his statements made on the witness-stand. The Sup onine Court affirmed
the action of the lower court saving, in substance, that under such
circumstances as here, where the chief defense was that plaintiff's
testimonv was perjured and evidence of inconsistent statements
had been given to impeach it, consonant statements were adImissable.
The doctrine of the admssilhilitv of consonant statements, to
remove from a witness the imputation of tintruthfultess or lack
of nemory placed upon him by proof of inconsistent declarations,
is not a new one. It apparentlv made its first appearance in the
law in 1670 in the case of Lutterel v. ReyneiP where the principle
was stated in general terms and without any qualifications. This
case was flatly contradicted in 1783 by Justice Buller in King v.
Parker.' For some reason, this latter case was completely overlooked by the American courts anti we find them stating Lutterell
v. RevnelI still to be the law as late as 1823." There are still a few
jurisdictions in the United States which have held to the original
rule unmodified and allow consonant statements to be admitted
whenever a witness's testimony has been impeached by inconsistent
declarations.- These jurisdictions, while admitting that under
the general prohibition against hearsay, this kind of evidence is
not admissible, sustain it as an exception for the purpose of sustaining the credibility of the witness.
This class of evidence has never been admitted to prove the
facts which the declarations contain,' and the majority of jurisdictions which hold that consonant statements are admissible only
under special circumstances7 do not bar them because they do
contain such facts but on the broader ground that ordinarily they
are worthless. In impeaching a witness by showing contrary
statements, the object is to show that he is unreliable, and the fact
that he made a statement not under oath, similar to the one he
makes at the trial, does not remove the inconsistency or the ininferences arising from such inconsistency.' Under some circumstances, however, evidence of this kind is of real value, and under such
circumstances practically all jurisdictions hold it is admissible.
Usually this is when the witness is charged with testifying under the
influence of some motive of interest or relationship prompting him
! i 'Mod. 283 (Eng., 1670).
King v. Parker, 3 Doug. 242 (Eng., 1783).
. Henderson v. Jones, io S. & R. 322 (Pa., 1823).
5 Dodd v. Moore, 92 Ind. 397 (1883): Burnett v. R. R. Co., 12o N. C. 517
(1897); Lee v. State. 44 Tex. Crim. 446 (19o3).
6 State v. Parish, 79 N. C. 61o (1878); Maitland v. Bank, 40 Md. 559 (1874).
7 State v. Hendricks, 172 Mo. 654 (1902); McKelton v. State, 86 Ala. 594
(1888); Mason v. Vestal, 88 Cal. 396 (1891); Davis v. Graham, 2 Col. App.
210 (1892); Ga. R. R. Co. v. Oaks, 52 Ga. 410 (1874); McBride v. Ga. R. R.
Co., 125 Ga. 515 (i9o6); State v. Porter. 74 Iowa 623 (1888); Heod v. State
44 Miss. 731 (187o); Crooks v. Brum. 136 Pa. St. 368 (189o); State v. McDaniel 68 S. C. 304 (i9o3); Dudley v. Bolles, 24 Vend. 464 (N. Y., 1840).
6 Nichols v. Stewart, 2o Ala. 358 (1852).
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to make a false statement. In such cases consonant statements are
admitted to show that he made similar statements at a time when
the imputed motive did not exist or v-hen motives of interest would
have induced him to make a different statement of facts. Again,
they are admitted where the story or a part of the story of a witness
Consonant statements,
is claimed to l)e a recent fabrication."
however, do not include mere conclusions or deductions, which
corroborate or suplprt evidence consisting of particular facts occurring in the transaction; former declarations of such deductions
are not almissible."
Some jurisdictions impose a further rtstriction on the adlmissibility of this evidence, and say that the consonant statement must
The reahave been made prior to the impeaching declarations.
son which is given is that if the rule were otherwise the witness
would be able at any time to control the effect of former declarations which ie was conscious he had made and which he might
now have a motive to weaken, qualify or destroy."1
Under facts similar to those in the principal case, it has lieen
held that the motive for the plaintiff to talk in his favor existed
as well when the statement was made as when the testimony was
given." It would seem therefore that although the law as stated
in the principal case is in accord with the majority of jurisdictions,
evidence having been admitted to combat the theory of recent
fabrication, it is doubtful whether, the witness having had a motive
for such declarations, they should have been admitted.
The aforementioned rules do not apply to declarations made
by the prosecutrix after the defendant has ravished her. In the
cases of rape, such declarations are confined to the bare fact, the
details of the occurrence and the identity of defendant being inadmissible." Although the purpose for which these statements are
admitted is the same as that for which consonant statements are
admitted, that is to corroborate the witness, the reason for admitting the declarations in the case of rape is not the same, but
merely a remnant of the old common law practice. Under the old
common law, a woman was forced while the crime was recent to go
to the nearest village and state the injury to the prominent men
and show the signs of violence." Admitting the complaints of the
9Stolp v. Blair, 68 Ill. 541 (1873); Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Mathieson,
I1. 299 (1904); McCord v. State, 83 Ga. 520 (1889), followed in Sweeny v.
State, 121 Ga. 293 (1904); Robb v. Hackley, 23 Wend. 52 (N. Y., 1840).
0l.egere v. State, iii Tenn. 370 (19o3); State v. Petty, 21 Kan. 54 (1878).
11Maitland v. Bank. 40 Md. 540 (1874).
12Conrad v. Griffy, Ii flow. 480 (U. S., 185o); State v. Cody, 15 So. D.
167 (19o); Graham v. McReynolds, 9o Tenn. 697 (1891).
" Ellicot v. Pearl, 35 U. S. 439 (1836).
Plaintiff
'4 McBride v. Ga. R. R. and Electric Co.. 125 Ga. 515 (1906).
declared he had been hurt in a railroad accident twenty minutes after accident
occurred.
1"Posey v. State, 143 Ala. 55 (19o4); Commonwealth v. Cleary, 172 Mass.
175 (1898).
1" Glanville XIV, 6.
212
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prosecutrix at the present day is the last remaining trace of this
old custom. 7
E.L.H.
TORTS-INTERFERENCE

WITH

ANOTHER'S

EMPLOYMENT-

STRIKES-The legality of strikes and the rights and remedies of

employers and employees who are affected by the act, of labor organizations are subjects which have plunged the courts into more
conflicting decisions than any other matters which have arisen in
modern times. The failure to agree upon what art: termed the fundamental and underlying principle, upon which these decisions are
based, is here, as in all such cases-barring, of course, the exact
circumstances giving rise to the actions-the reason for this conflict.
Will that which is lawful when done with a good motive be lawful
when prompted by a malicious t motive, and will that which is lawful when done by a single individual be lawful when (lone by a
combination of individuals are two of these principles which were
carefully considered in Kemp v. Division 24z A, Ass'n. Street and
E. Ry. Employees.!
It is sometimes broadly stated that an act which does not
amount to a legal injury cannot be actionable because (lone with a4
bad intent,' and numerous decisions support the proposition.
Where the right to act is absolute, it is difficutt to see how any other
conclusion can be sustained, even though the act is not done to
benefit the actor, but solely to injure another. Such is the case
where the owner of land forcibly ejects a trespasser who refuses to
leave, even though the owner may only be gratifying a vindictive
spirit in so acting. The erection of a "spite fence," under this
view clearly is not actionable; but even on this point, the decisions
are in conflict. 5 On the other hand, if the right to act is what
may be termed relative, there may be some reason for considering
the question of motive. Such is the case where one sinks a well
on his own premises for the mere purpose of (trying his neighbor's
spring,' or recklessly wastes natural resources without any benefit
17Commonwealth v. Cleary, supra.
I "Malice." and its derivatives, as used in this note means simply ill-will
against a person and does not presuppose the intentional doing of an unlawful
act.
299 N. E. Rep. 389 (11., 19t2).
In this case the court refused to stamp
as unlawful a threat to call a strike unless workmen who refused to remain in
the union were discharged.
2 Cooley on Torts (3rd Ed.) 15o3.
4 Allen v. Flood, L. R. App. Cas. 1 (1898); Quinn v. Leatham, (19o) App.
Cas. 495, qualifies this case. but does not overrule it. Payne v.Western R. R.
Co., 13 Lea. 507 (Tenn., 1884); Chambers v. Baldwin. 91 Ky. 121 (1891); National Protective Assoc. v. Cummings. 170 N. Y. 315 (1902); McCune v. Norwich Gas Co., 3o Conn. 521 (1862); Forster v. McKibben, 14 Pa. 168 (i85o).
In these cases the act of but a single person was in question.
5 Letts v.Kesler, 54 Ohio St. 73 (1896), action not maintainable; Flaherty
v. Moran. 8t Mich. 52 (189o), contra.
6See i8 Harvard Law Review 114, and cases cited.
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to himself.7 Now the right of every laborer to cease working for
his employer whenever he pleases, and the right of every employer
to dispense with the services of an employee whenever he pleasesin the absence, of course, of any existing contractual relationmust in practically every case be what has been termed an absolute
right. It ought to follow, therefore, that so far as individual employees and employers are concerned the motive which prompts
the decision to quit the employer or discharge the employee, as the
case may be, cannot be taken into consideration. The right is
absolute and whatever the motive, the damage resulting from the
exercise of such right is clearly damnnum absque injuria.
Now, suppose that a combination of individuals exercises the
right which is absolute so far as each individual is concerned, does
the resulting damage still remain damnum absque injuria? It is
certainly true that if the motive in such case is not malicious, but
purely a genuine benefit to the individuals severally, through the
combination as a whole, there being no intent to injure the party
damaged, no action is maintainable. This is the situation which
arises when several employces agree among themselves to stop
work-i. e., strike--in order to procure higher wages, more sanitary conditions in work-shops, shorter hours, etc. In all such cases
the strike is clearly lawful.' It will be noted here that the conception of a strike-a mere quitting of employment-in no sense
covers unlawful acts performed by the employees either before or
after they have quitted the employment in order to make the strike
effective. But the situation becomes more troublesome when the
motive of the combination is not alone benefit to itself, but also
injury to another, and again, when the.motive is solely injury to
another. If it be contended in such case that the act of the combination is unlawful, it is, in effect, holding that the sum total of
several absolute rights is a relative right, not exactly a logical conclusion. But law is not logic, and so it is not surprising to find that
probably a majority of the courts and text-writers hold, in analogy
to a conspiracy in the criminal law, that it will not do to treat a
combination simply as an aggregate of independent parts, and
7Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190 (1899); Hague v. Wheeler, 157
Pa. 324 (1893).
' The idea has been advanced that the nature of the employment may create
an implied agreement not to quit, at least without reasonable notice. Such
was the doctrine implied in Toledo Ry. Co. v. Penna. Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 746
(C. C. of Ohio. 1893). The duty imposed upon the employing company by the
Interstate Commerce Law was presumed to be known to the employees here.
' Carew v. Rutherford, io6 Mass. 1 (1870); Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 114 (1894); Clement v. Watson, 14 Ind. App. 38 (i895);
Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 310 (1894). Mapstrick v. Ramge, 9 Neb. 390
(1879) is contra, but here it was held that striking at the particular hour agreed
upon, owing to peculiar circumstances, was equivalent to the actual and wilful
destruction of the property.
Early English cases held strikes illegal, Hornby v. Close, 2 L. R. Q. B. 153
(1867), but recent decisions have established their legality. Lyons v. Willans, i L. R. Ch. (t896) 811.

NOTFS

measure its rights and responsibilities by the rights and responsibilities of its individual members.10
The result of the failure of the courts to adopt a logical conclusion which, it is submitted, will not result in the "incalculable
damage" so often intimated in the decisions. has been the adoption
of the test of "justifiahle cause" in letermining the legality of a
strike, and what constitutes interference with the right to labor.
It is needless to say that hopeless conflict is the result of the question as to what constitutes *justifiable cause." ' n
It must be remembered that, in this discussion, it is presumed
that no violence, threats of violence or any other unlawful-neans
have been used by the employees in bringing about a strike. If
such has been the case, the act of the individual employee was not
the outgrowth of an absolute right, and an entirely different situation is presented. In Kemp v. E. Ry. Employees,"t the defendants
peacably informed their employers that if the plaintiffs were not
discharged they, the defendants, would cease work; they had no
grievance against their employers and the sole reason for their
action was the fact that Kemp refused to join their union. The
court found that the motive of the defendants was not injury to the
plaintiff, but benefit to themselves through preservation of their
union, anti held that whatever damage resulted from the discharge
of the plaintiff was daninum absque injuria. It is submitted that
the court might better have founded their decision upon the right
of the combination to do that which the individual members had
an absolute right to do, than upon the ultimate benefit to the organization. For the benefit to members of the combination is so
remote as compared to the direct and immediate injury inflicted
upon the non-union workmen, that the law ought not to look beyond the immediate loss and damage to the innocent parties to
the remote benefits that might result to the union.
H. IV. M.
TORTS-LIABILITY TO BUSINESS GUESTS-A recent decision'
of the court of King's Bench, in England, affords an interesting
exarfiple of the difficult legal problems which arise out of the complexities of modern civilized life. The first question presented is as
to the status of an individual who is allowed to enter a mercantile
establishment under conditions which are contrary to its rules,
but who is allowed to violate the customary regulations in order
that his patronage may be secured. Is such an individual a trespasser, a licensee, a business guest under special conditions or is
10Eddy on Combinations, Vol. i § 475;.Berry3 v. Donovan, I88 Mass. 353
(19o5); Erdman v. Nlitchell, 207 Pa. 79 (1903); Lucke v. Clothing Cutters, 77
Md. 396 (1893); Curran v. Galen. 152 N. Y. 33 (1897). But see Cook on Trade
and Labor Combinations, § 8.
t62 L. R. A. 715, note.
1199 N. E. Rep. 389 (I1. 1912).
1 Clinton v. Lyons & Co., III K. B. 98 (1912); also 81 L. J. R. 923 (K. B.).
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his status similar in all respects to that of ordinary customers? The
decision in the case under discussion declaredl that the plaintiff, who
in ignorance of a rule ,, the contrary, entered the defendant's
tea-shop with her dog and was allowed to remain there, was not
really "invited" to come in with her log. but was only "permitted"
to do so; and accordingly held that her status was merely that of a
licensee.
It is believed that this finding is incorrect; and that a prospective customer who enters an establishment unlder conditions
which violate its rules is either a trespasser or a simple business
guest according to whether or not the management acquiesce ih
this violation of their conditions. It would seem that no individual
who enters a place of business for purposes of trade can really properly be regarded as a licensee, since such a status includes only
those who come on the premises solely for purposes of their own,'
while the unquestioned definition of a business guest is that laid
down by Willes, J., in the famous case of Inderinaurv. Dames,'
namely, that it is an individual who "resorts to the premises in
the course of business upon invitation' express or implied." To
return to the principal case, it seems entirely clear that the plaintiff's position is certainly not that of a trespasser, since her entry in
violation of the rules of the premises was condoned by the management; it is equally clear that, being on the premises on business
and not merely for purposes of her own, she was not a mere
licensee, but that she was in fact "resorting to the premises
in the cause of business upon the implied invitation" of the defendant company, and was accordingly a business guest, within the
definition of Willes, J., who -was merely allowed to violate
the usual rules of the establishment. Now it appears scarcely
logical to say that such an individual was a busness guest admitted
under special conditions. No conditions were really imposed
upon her entrance, but what occurred was that the usual
stipulations were removed; and it seems a contradiction
to maintain that a guest for whom restrictions have been removed
is consequently a guest upon special conditions. In other words, no
conditions have been "imposed," but the usual ones have been
It is accordingly submitted that acquiescence
merely "removed."
on the part of the management of an establishment in the violation
of their usual rules is simply equivalent to an absolute waiver
thereof in the particular instance and should in no way change the
2 "A license is inferred where the object is the mere pleasure or benefit of
the person using the premises, while an invitation is inferred where there is a
common interest or mutual advantage to be derived from the visit." Burdick,
Torts, p. 456; Campbell, Neg., sec. .33: Bennett v. Ry. Co., 102 U. S. 577 (1880).
3 L. R. I C. P. 274 (1866).
The definition given by Willes, J., in this case
"has since been regarded on both sides of the Atlantic as the leading authority." 4 Pollock, Torts (5th Ed.). p. 5o9.
That an individual who enters a mercantile establishment on business
does so on an implied invitation is a proposition of law too well settled to be
open to question today.

NOTES

statts af the customer in whose favor and for the sake of whose
patronage such an exception is made.
The principal case further presents the difficult problem as to
the extent of the scope of the status of a business guest. In other
words,. the question raised is as to how far the legal status of a
business guest extends as a protection to ,;uch property
as the guest may bring upon the premises. It would seem from
the statement' of Brav, J.. that this legal status extends to cover
such icidents of lxrs011lty as are invited into the business establishment. In denying recovery for injuries to the plaintiff's
dog, he says, "Then did the defendants invite the dog into their
shop? There is no finding to that effect and it-cannot e sufficient
if they merely permitted it to come in.

In my opinion .

.

.

both

claims fail." Now it is entirely clear that whether or not a given
article is "invited" to be brought into an establishment or is
merely "permitted" to be carried in by the owncr must of necessity
depend upon the character of the property in question and the
nature of the establishment. For instance there can be no doubt
that a business guest is always invited to bring into a store or shop
such ordinary incidents of personal property as a hat or a watch,
or an umbrella or a cane, and consequently such property falls
within the protection accorded to the owner by law. It is equally
clear that an individual who goes shopping with a large dog or
who enters an ordinary business establislment carrying explosives
is, even though there is no rule against bringing them in, nevertheless merely permitted to do so. Objectionable property of such a
nature is clearly not invited in by the business agencies and consequently such property is not guarded by the status of the owner.
It is believed that this question just discussed has not before
been directly presented and it is a matter of considerable difficulty
to formulate the correct rule of law which should govern the matter.
It is, however, tentatively submitted that the legal status of a
business guest should be regarded as including within its protective
scope such ordinary incilents of personalty as the average individual would ordinarily take into the kind of establishment in question while shopping, and that the jury should be left to determine
whether or not the property in question was of this character.
P. C. m., Jr.
TRUSTS-Is
CIIARITY?-JUSt

TIE

PROPAGATION

OF

CHRISTIAN

SCIENCE A

how far a court will go to uphold a trust established for charitable purposes is most forcibly illustrated in a recent
Massachusetts decision,' where a bequest in the will of the late
Mrs. Eddy was attacked by her heirs-at-law. The controversy
centered around the interpretation of a local statute' which prohibited gifts for the benefit of any one church where the amount
sOn p. 932, L. J.R. (K. B.).
Chase v. Dickey, 13 N. E. Rep. 410 (Mass.
I R. L c. 37. 19.

1912).
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involved exceeded two thousand dollars. In this case the devise,
far in excess of two thousand dollars, was to the "Mother Church"
in Boston in trust for the purposes of keeping in repair certain of
the church buildings, while the balance of the income and as much
of the principal as might be decred wise was to be devoted to the
promotion and extension of Christian Sicence as taught by the
testatrix herself.
Though there were many points raised in the dispute, for the
purposes of this discussion it is sufficient to dwell only upon the
manner in which the charity was supported in the face of the existing statute.
It may be generally said that the distinction between public
the
and private trusts lies in the fact that in the former instance
benefit accrues to an indefinite number of persons at large,3 while
in the latter case, certain definite, defined, specified objects are
designated as the beneficiaries. 4 The fact that the bequest is made
to a voluntary, unincorporated association will in no way defeat
the charity provided the general charitable intention of the testator is clear.5 Once established that a trust for charitable purposes has been created, the courts will not allow it to fall for want
or inability of trustees to take,' and in some circumstances where
the bequest is void because contrary to the law, the objects will
be carried out under the cy pres doctrine.! In such cases there is
no reason to suppose that the discretion of any particular trustee
has anything to do with the essence of the trust gift.'
3 Perry on Trusts, § 710; Parker v. May, 5 Cush. 336 (Mass., 1850); Everett
v. Carr, 59 Me. 335 (1871); Coggesshall v. Pelton, 7 Johns. Ch. 294 (N. Y.,

1823).4

Teele v. Bishop -'fDerry, 168 Mass. 341 (1897); Russell v. Allen, 1o 7
U. S. 163 (1882), per the court: "Trusts for public charitable purposes are applied under circumstances under which private trusts would fail. Being for
objects of permanent interest and benefit to the public, they may be perpetual
in their direction, and instruments creating them should be construed so as to
give them effect if possible and to carry out the general intention of the donor,
when clearly manifested, even if the particular form and manner pointed out by
him can not be followed. They may and indeed must be for the benefit of an
indefinite number of persons, for if all the beneficiaries are personally designated, the trust lacks the essential element of indefiniteness which is one characteristic of a legal charity. If the founder describes the general nature of the
charitable trust, he may leave the details of its administration to be settled by

under the supervision of a court of.chancery."
trustees
5
Attornev-General v. Oglander, 3 Bro. Ch. t66 (1790); Re Dudgen, 74 L.
T. 613" (1896); Burrill v. Boardman, 43 N. Y. 254 (1871); Libby v. Tobbein,
163 Mo. 477 (i8qo); Chamber v. Higgins' Exec., 2o Ky. Law 1425 (1899);
Christian Church v. First Church of Christ, 219 Ill- 503 (19o6).
6 Keith v. Scales, 124 N. C. 497 (1899); Estate of Winchester, 133 Cal.

271 (19oi); St. Peter's Church v. Brown, 21 R. J. 367 (1899); Hesketh v. Murphy,
35 N. 1. Eq. 23 (1882); Appeal of Eliot, 74 Conn. s86 (19o2); Jones v. Watford,
62 N. J. Eq. 339 (19oi); l.eda v. Huble, 75 Iowa, 431 (1888); Bliss v. American
Bible Society. 2 Allen 334 (Mass., z861).
7 Moggride v. Thackwell, 7 Yes. Jr. 75 (x862); Woman's Christian Asso.
v. Kansas City, 147 Mo. 103 (t898).
8 avter v. Trego, 5 Russ. 113 (1830); Denyer v. Druce, Tamlyn's 32
Phil. Ch. 290 (843); Brown v. Higgs, 8Ves.
(t829); Walsh v. Gladstone,
Jr. 571 (18o3); Cole v. Wade, 16 Ves. Jr. 29 (1807).

INOTES

Where legacies are given in trust for purposes that are clearly
charitable, but these purposes are joined with words that authorize
the trustees to expend the fund for other purposes which are not
charitable the whole gift falls.' But the courts make a distinction
where a residue is given to charity and out of such residue certain
lequests are made which are sublsequently unenforceable. Such
void bequests merely fall into the residue and.the whole of the fund
is applied to the charitable purpose., 0 Of courSe, if it is impossible
to execute the particular charity for which provision is made, the
devise falls altogether.
In the present case, there was a devise for the upkeep of church
buildings, payable out of the general fund given to the spread of
Christian Science. It was contended that the first part of the
trust was void and so the whole should be inoperative. But the
repair of parishes has long been held a valid charitable object" and
so the courts were confronted with the sole proposition whether
the intention of the testatrix was to have the fund devoted for the
promotion of her own religion in the Christian world or whether
the benefit was to be confined to the members of the "Mother
Church" in Boston. In the latter instance, the gift would necessarily have to fall owing to the prohibitive statute. But in
reaching a contrary conclusion, the court seemed to have in mind
the peculiar and almost supernatural disposition of the donor.
Though the bequest on trust was undoubtedly to the Boston congregation, who were unable to act as trustees owing to the statute,
yet the wording in the concluding phrase was of such a broad and
liberal nature that the court had little difficulty in upholding it as
a charity.
Just what influence the popularity and enthusiasm for this
twentieth century religion, so prevalent among a respectable, yet
thinking class of citizens. had upon the minds of those rendering
the decision is a question more of psychological interest than of
legal import. Suffice it to say that the case is valuable for the
authorities cited and interesting as illustrating to what extent the
courts of that jurisdiction will go in supporting a trust whenever the
tenets and dogmas of any Christian belief are involved.1"
W. A. TV., 2nd.
' Gibbs v. Ramsey, 2 Ves. & B. 295 (1813); Kendall -v. Granger, 5 Beav.
v. Attorney-General. 197 Mass. 232 (98); Williams v. Kershaw, 5 Law J. (N. S.) Ch. 84 (1835); Minot v. Attorney-Gencral, 176 Mass.
189 (9o5).
10 Dawson v. Smally, L. R. 18 Eq. 114 (1868); In Re Birkett, 9 Ch. Div.
576 (1878); Fisk v. Attorney-General, L. R. 4 Eq. 521 (1867); Hoare v. Osborne, L. R. 1 Eq. 583 (1866); Mayor of Lyons v. East India Co., 1 Moore P.
C. 175 (1836); Dexter v. Harvard Collcge, 176 Mass. 192 (19oo); In Re Roger.
son, L. R. i Ch. Div. 715 (19ox).
" In Re White, 33 Ch. Div. 449 (1886).
12Attorney-General v. Bishop of Chester, i Browns C. C. 444 (1785); Ix
Re Vaughan, L. R. 33 Ch. Div. 137 (t886).
13McAlister v. Burgess. 16l Mass. 269 (1894); Jackson v. Phillips, 14
Allen 539 (Mass. 1867), where it was said: "A charity is a gift to be applied
consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of per300 (1842); Gill
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WILLS-TUIE RULEs IN WILD'S AND SHELLEY'S CASES-In
Wild's Case, it was resolved that "if A devises his lands to B and to
his children or issue, and he hath not any issue at the time'of the
devise, the same is an estate' tail; for the intent of the donor is
manifest and certain that his children or issue should take, and as
immediate devisees they cannot take because they are not in rerun
natura, and by way of remainder they cannot take, for that was
not his intent, for the gift is immediate, therefore, then, such
words will be taken as words of limitation."I In a late Pennsylvania case,' under facts identical, the court held that the devisee
took a lift! estate and that his children, if there should be any,
would take the remainder in fee. Wild's Case dismissed such an
interpretation with the remark that it was not the testator's intent. Both these courts, anl all others, would admit, or, rather,
would assert that the testator's intent was the pole star to guide
them in navigating the difficult flood of testamentary language;
with the same beacon before them, they arrive at antipodal harbors. The later decision would .seem to be more logical and certainly more satisfactory. If the professed intent is to benefit the
children surely the most effective way of doing it is by giving them
the estate in remainder rather than by the doubtful expedient of
giving their father a fee, especially where the contingent remainder
can no longer be barred.
The above difference of opinion is one of construction, purely,

and over questions of construction courts not infrequently are at
odds. As to the question under discussion here, there seems to
be an almost equal division. In England, the rule in Wild's Case
is still the law. In some American jurisdictions, it has been expressly applied in decision," in others approved in dictum.' On the
other hand, it has been flatly repudiated in a number of jurisdictions.' Frequently, it has been quoted without comment either
way, but cases directly involving the application of the rule are
not numerous.
sons, either by bringing their minds and hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint,
by assisting them to establish themselves in life, by erecting or maintaining
public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government."
16 Co. Rep., 16 b. This rule is a dictum; the decision in thecasewasthata
gift to A and after his decease to his children gave A a life estate only.
' Chambers v. Union Trust Co., 235 Pa. 61o (1912).
Scale v. Barter, 2 B. & P. 485 (Eng., 18o1); Broadhurst v. Morris, 2 B.&

A. i (Eng., 1831).
4 Nightengale v.Burrell. j5 Pick. 104 (Mass., 1833); Parkman v.Bowdoin,
i Sumn. C. C. 359 (Fed., 1833); Vanzant v. Morris, 25 Ala. 285 (1854).
5Graih v. Flower, 13 S. & R. 439 (Pa., A826);'Cannon v. Barry, 59 Miss.
289 (1881); Chryfee v. Phyfe, ig N. Y. 344 (1859);
'Carr v.Estell. 16 B. Monroe 3o9 (Ky., 1855); Faliso v. Currir, 55 N. H. 3 z
(1875): Josey v. White, 8 Ga. 270, where the court says, in speaking of this
rule: -'With the reason of this or any other technical lore, connected with this
branch of,the law, I have nothing to do. Thank God, it no longer encumbers
our statute book. Under our late act. it will soon be buried, with the numerous
other follies and fossil remains of a bygone age;" but, see Butler v. Ralston,
69 Ga. 485 (1882) where the rule is applied.

NOTES

That the rule is one of construction to ascertain the testamentarv intention can be seen readily from its relation to the more
general law. The word "'children- when used in will or deed is
presumptively a word of purchase. just as the words "heirs" or
"heirs of the bxly" are presumptively words of limitation. Both
presumptions are equally strong, but both can be rebutted, only,
however, by definite ani conclusive manifestations of a contrary
intent.' Tile word "issue" is almost colorless; standing alone it
is weakly presumptive of limitation, but it may be influenced
either way by the proximity of the other words. The rule in Wild's
Case s said to e an exception to the presumption arising from the
It is
word "children," but this appears to be a misstatement.
not an exception, it simply establishes facts sufficient to rebut the
above presumption. Inasmuch as it is merely a rule- of construction to arrive at the intent f the donor, it would seem that it too
should be subject to rebuttal. In fact, in one English case, the
court refused to apply the rule where, as the court saw it, there
would result an over-riding of the testator's intent.'
Not until the donor's intent is ascertained is the more famous
and more controverted rule in Shelley's Case" called into play.
Then if it is found that the testator or grantor, in using the word
"heir" or "issue" or "children," had in mind the sum total of
those who might claim through the devisee, or grantee, named as
an ancestor, and not a certain definite individual or class of individuals in existence at the termination of the first donee's life,
the rule must be applied and the latter takesa fee tail ora fee simple.
The rule supplements and puts into effect the intention as first
ascertained by the court. It has nothing to do with determining
the intent: it is simply an automatic rule of law relating to the
tenure of land, and as such is arbitrary and irrebuttable.u In the
United States, it has suffered from legislative displeasure and has
either been expressly revoked or practically legislated out of existence by statutory rules to the effect that a gift to a man for life
and after his death to his heirs, issue or children shall be taken to
be a life estate followed by a remainder, in short, that these words
shall always be interpreted as words of purchase when used in this
manner. A gift to a man and his heirs will remain as it always was,
a gift in fee. What of a gift to a man and his children? Will the
old rule in Wild's Case apply to it and having been applied to resolve the intent, will the rule in Shelley's case apply to make it a
fee? Clearly not in those jurisdictions where the latter has been
7 Kent's Commentaries, p. 229: Washburn on Real Property, Vol. 2, p.
275: Rogers v. Rogers, 3 Vend. 5o3 (N. Y.. 1829); Lessee of Findley v. Riddle.
3 Binne). 139.148 (Pa., i8io); Doev. Gaff, ii East, 668 (Eng., 18o9); Guthrie'a
Appeal. 37 Pa. 9 (86o).
I Chrystie -. Phyfe, 19 N. Y. 344 (1859); and see the criticism in Cannar
v. Barry.'59 Miss. 289 (z881).
9 Buffar v. Bradford. 2 Atkyn 220 (1741).
10i Co. 93b. io4b (1579-1581).
"Perrin v. Blake. i W. BI. 672 (1769); but see, Phillips, "The Rule in
Shelley's Case." (London, 18o5) p. 19.
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revoked, but what of these other jurisdictions? Probably and
properly, the courts would hold that this came within the spirit of
the act so as to give the children a remainder in fee, as was held in
the Pennsylvania case without the aid of a statute. In several,
the rule remains unimpaired by statute and preserving muchof its
old vigor, although the courts seem reluctant to call it into action
through misapprehension as to its real function."
To return to the Pennsylvania case, it quotes the rule in Wild's
Case and its alternative which is really a statement of earlier common law. It is: "Where a man devises land to A and his children
or issue and he has issue of his body then his express intent may
take effect, according to the rule of the common law, and no manifest
and certain intent appears to the contrary, and therefore they shall
have but a joint estate for life." Compare this with the first rule
and it will be seen that itmakes a world of difference whether or not
there were children at the time of the devise. To a layman if not
to a lawyer this variation in fact would hardly seem to warrant
the wide difference in the conclusions. The words used in the original case were "at the time of the devise" which apparently means
at the time of the execution of the will. Some courts take it to
mean at the time the will takes effect, at the death of the testator."
This second resolution or rule was used in early Pennsylvania
cases, but they are practically overruled today and now a gift to a
man and his children will give him a life estate with remainder to
the children whether or not there were children at the time of the
devise." In the Pennsylvania case first alluded to, the court considered the question, under the facts there presented, as res nova and
held in accord with cases under the second rule that the devisee
took a life estate only. There are, however, earlier cases which
by way of dictum, if not by actual decision, would seem to justify
a contrary conclusion'
Authorities are not united in respect to this second rule.
England, apparently, accepts it along with the first." Several
American jurisdictions have applied it in decision or approved it
in dictum." Usually it is coupled with the first rule and both are
stated to be the general law. But other jurisdictions have refused
to apply it, and, as in Pennsylvania, have given the devisee named
12Price v. Griffin, 1so N. C. 523 (19o9);.Bails v. Davis, 241 Il1.536 (19o9);
Guthrie's Appeal, 37 Pa. 9 (186o).
Z Jarman on Wills, Vol. 3. (5th Am. Ed.) p. 177.
1Rule 2 was applied in Graham v. Flowers, 13 S. & R. 439 (Pa., 1826),
and in Shirlock v. Shirlock, 5 Pa. 367 (1847), and was repudiated in Hague v.
Hague, 16x Pa. 643 (1894); Coussey v. Davis, 46 Pa. 25 (1863); and in Vaughn's
Est., 230 Pa. 554 (igi).
'5 Seibert v. Wise. 70 Pa. 147 (t871); Cresslio's Est., t61 Pa. 424 (1894);
Oyster v. Oyster, 191 Pa. 6o6 (1899).
1"Webb v. Byng, 8 De G. M. & G. 633 (1856).
'7 Nightengale v. Burrell. 15 Peck. 104 (Mass., 1833); Allen v. Hoyt,
5 Metc. 325 (Mass., 1842); Buzzo v. McCarty, 86 Ind. 352 (1882); Dean
v. Long, 122 III. 447 (1887); Utz Est., 43 Cal. 201 (1872); Wills v. Foltz, 62
W Va. 262 (1907).
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a life estate, remainder to the children as a class, to open and let
in after-born children."' it one case, it was held that such words
created a fee even though children were living." It should be
remembered that this latter rule likewise merely establishes a presumption and can be rebutted by evidence of a contrary intent of
S
the testator as appears in the statement of it.0
J. S.B.
"Coimsey v. Davis., 46 Pa. 25 (1863) and Pa. caes cited in Chambers v.
Trust Co., 235 Pa. 6to (1912); Hatfield v. Sohier, 114 Mass. 48 (1873).
19"Musby v. Paul's Adm'r., 88 Va. 533 (1892).
"Jarman, VoL 3. P. 179.

